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     This paper investigates manufacturer-supplier relationships in Japan 
based on field research on two major industries. I show first that various 
modes of relations exist and that longstanding relations are more densely 
distributed where customized parts are transacted. Then I show that this 
phenomenon is to be ascribed to ratings exercised by the purchasing firm on 
some skill accumulated by each supplier. I construct the concept of 
multidimensional relation-specific skill accumulated by each supplier through 
learning and technological investments, and relate this concept to Aoki's work 
on relational quasi-rent and Williamson's scheme to classify transactions.
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1. Introduction 
     There have been several prevailing notions concerning the nature of 
manufacturer-supplier relationships developed in Japan. Especially widely 
held are the following two. First, a typical Japanese manufacturing firm 
tends to buy only from a select group of firms which has been formed having 
this firm either as the organizer or as a participating member thereof; 
members of such a group maintain perpetual business relations with each other , 
which non-members face difficulties to enter. Second, formation of such a 
group is a phenomenon specific to Japan and is therefore to be explained only 
in terms of cultural or historical peculiarities of the Japanese. 
     As to the first notion above, one could easily collect casual examples 
which appear to endorse them. To ascertain whether such purchasing practices 
have indeed been followed regardless of the type of the final product 
manufactured and that of the intermediate good transacted , however, systematic 
comparisons have to be made between different industries. But the literature 
to date seems to lack the backing of such studies. The primary objective of 
this paper is to fill this gap based on a series of field research that I 
conducted on the Japanese automobile and electric machinery industries since 
1982. 
     Following the view originally put forth by Williamson (1979), I adopt the 
hypothesis that the mode of governance structure systematically differs 
depending on the nature of transactions and that longstanding relations 
between a manufacturer and suppliers thereto can be analyzed as just a subset 
of the entire set of such different modes which governance structure can 
take. I focus on the relations between typical large firms that manufacture 
the final products of the two industries and those suppliers thereto that are 
                                                 - 1 -
on the first tier and are supplying recurrently transacted parts. For brevity , 
henceforth I call each of the former a "core firm," and each of the latter a 
"supplier ." Based on interviews with managers in relevant positions, I 
investigate how the relations vary depending on characteristics of the final 
products and of the parts, and then analyze causal factors. 
     The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I show the 
basic structure of the contractual framework which is used to govern recurrent 
type transactions of parts in each of the two industries, touching upon the 
characteristic composition of suppliers that surround core firms in each 
industry. It already becomes evident here that types of relations and of 
suppliers are not so homogeneous as is implied by the prevailing notion, at 
least in the electric machinery industry. In Section 3, I differentiate 
systematically several types of relations and of suppliers. As a consequence, 
it is shown that longstanding relations are to be found more densely where 
customized parts are transacted and that this is based on high ratings which 
the suppliers concerned receive from the core firm. This pair of findings 
evoke the following question. What kind of specific capabilities are required 
of to be rated as a superior supplier of customized parts? In Section 4, I 
tackle this question and formulate the concept of relation-specific skill. In 
Section 5, I show how the results presented in this paper can be related to 
the existing theoretical literature. First, I show the notion of relational 
quasi-rent and its sharing among members of a group of firms presented by Aoki 
(1988) can be based on the concept of relation-specific skill as I 
constructed. Second, I briefly discuss how the scheme presented in this paper 
can be related to Williamson's framework to classify transactions. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Structure of the Contractual Framework 
     In this section I first describe the contractual framework that governs 
transactions of parts in the automobile industry and then compare it to its 
counterpart in the electric machinery industry. I show that while business 
relations in the automobile industry are indeed typically longstanding as has 
been generally perceived, they are more heterogeneous in the electric 
machinery industry. Further, I show that even the relations in the automobile 
industry contain various aspects that differ from the conventional view which 
spotlights family-like group formation. They include competition among 
potential suppliers, bargaining between core firms and suppliers, as well as 
cooperation between them. 
2.1 The automobile industry 
     Casual observers have asserted that written contracts are largely lacking 
in Japanese business practice, but this is incorrect. Instead of a single 
contract which prescribes specifications of the item to be delivered, its 
price, and other aspects of the transaction in one shot, there are a set of 
contracts, documents that function as contracts, and well-established 
practices. Assembly of these pieces in a coherent way gives a contractual 
framework, by which recurrent type transactions of parts are regulated in 
Japanese industries. 
     At the very basic level, there is a contract called the "basic contract," 
which is exchanged when a core firm enters into a business relation with a 
supplier. The duration of this contract is usually one year, but it is 
automatically renewed unless either side raises an objection. This contract 
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by itself may seem vague since it determines only general obligations of both 
parties that should be obeyed irrespective of specific items to be 
transacted. It gives, however, useful clues for grasping the total 
contractual framework. For one thing, it provides that monthly schedules 
should be regarded as contracts once the supplier gives its consent to it. It 
states, further, that kanbans are fine tunings which the core firm can add to 
each such schedule if the supplier agrees to the introduction of the kanban 
system. For another, it states that an occasion for the renegotiation of 
prices is provided regularly, usually at six-month intervals. 
     But the basic contract does not state when the initial level of the price 
is determined. Nor does it reveal how long deliveries by each supplier are 
supposed to continue. To know such aspects, actual practices should be 
observed, focusing on the life cycle of each model of a car. 
     For passenger cars, recent practice is to make a full model change every 
four years and to conduct a minor model change inbetween. Prior to the model 
change, there is a period for development. Specifications for, and suppliers 
of, each part of the new model, as well as the price thereof, are determined 
during this development period. Once a supplier receives an order for a part 
when the commercial production of the new model is launched, his delivery 
normally continues for two years if the part is of the kind which changes at 
the time of the minor model change and for four years if the part changes only 
at the time of the full model change. 
     It is of crucial importance to understand precisely the relation between 
this practice of nonswitching and the so-called "two-vendor policy," the 
meaning of which is given below. Let us first look at broad groups of parts 
such as head lamp, brake, steering column, etc., and refer to them as kinds of 
parts. At this level, each core firm seeks to secure more than one--typically 
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two to three--suppliers for each kind and hold them in parallel. One of these 
is in some cases an in-house parts manufacturing plant of the core firm 
itself. This policy, which is often called the "two-vendor policy," has two 
objectives. One is to insure against a sudden stoppage of delivery from 
either source due to accidents. The other is to put competitive pressure on 
the suppliers to educe a more cooperative attitude with respect to prices and 
quality than would otherwise be available. Let us next turn to each 
particular part such as the head lamp designed for the current model of 
Corona, the brake adopted for the current model of Accord, the steering column 
assembled to the current model of Capella, etc. Let us call it a subkind of 
part. There is a remarkable tendency for each core firm to assign 
responsibility for the supply of a subkind of part to a single supplier. One 
important reason for this practice seems to be avoidance of a duplicate 
investment in the same kind of specific dies and jigs since, as is reported by 
Asanuma (1984b), the financial burden for this type of investment has to be 
borne in one way or another by the core firm.l) Irrespective of the 
underlying reason, however, this practice stabilizes the status of each 
supplier during the life of a given model. 
     Consequently, quantity adjustment in the automobile industry is performed 
in the following way. The quantity of a given part which a supplier is asked 
by the core firm to deliver in the course of the next month varies from month 
to month. This variation occurs, however, exactly in proportion to the 
fluctuation in demand for the car to which the part in question is assembled. 
The core firm and its suppliers share the effects of business upswings and 
downswings as long as the life of a given model continues. 
     On the other hand, when the life of a given model comes to an end, there 
is no guarantee that each firm which has been supplying some part for that 
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model can receive an order for the same kind of part for the new model . 
Competition resumes among the suppliers which have the general capability of 
supplying that kind of part. In the case of the automobile industry, this 
competition is for the most part limited to a small number of firms which have 
already been supplying that kind of part to the core firm. Based on ratings 
of these suppliers, its policy concerning the allocation of business shares 
among them, as well as an assessment of the proposal submitted by each 
candidate for the supplier of the new part, the core firm selects a suitable 
supplier (or suppliers) for each part. 
     Note in this connection that typical core firms are manufacturing a 
number of makes of car in parallel and make staggered model changes every 
year. As a consequence, competition among potential suppliers for each new 
part seems to have worked considerably well as a means for core firms to educe 
favorable terms of trade from suppliers. 
     However, at the same time, it seems to be a remarkable aspect of the 
Japanese automobile industry that the members of the set of suppliers to each 
core firm are both relatively small in number and relatively very stable in 
identity. For instance, as of 1984, the member firms of Kyohokai , an 
association formed by the suppliers of parts to Toyota Motor Company, numbered 
171. Of these 171, 153 firms had been continually members of that association 
during the eleven years since 1973. During the same year period, exits from 
the association numbered only 3, whereas new entrants numbered 21.2) 
     It would be incorrect to regard a typical core firm as relying 
exclusively on associated firms for parts obtained from outside the company. 
For instance, as of 1983, Nissan Motor Company bought 10 percent of such parts 
from non-associated firms. Still, we can see from these figures that, in the 
case of the automobile industry, a dominant portion of parts obtained from 
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outside the company is purchased from firms with which the core firm has 
longstanding relations. 
     As a matter of fact, those suppliers that have established a longstanding 
relation with a given core firm typically have succeeded in receiving orders 
continually. This has contributed toward nurturing a feeling among suppliers 
that they share a common fate with the core firm, despite the fact that they 
have to face ratings from the core firm and engage in renegotiations on 
business terms with the core firm at regular intervals. 
2.2 The electric machinery industry 
     A typical core firm in the automobile industry produces essentially one 
single kind of final product, the automobile. It is produced continuously in 
the typical way of mass production and is a product which is in a relatively 
mature stage with respect to technology. By contrast, a typical core firm in 
the electric machinery industry produces many kinds of final products that are 
extremely diverse both with respect to the typical scale of production, which 
in turn is determined by the volume and the time pattern of incoming demand, 
and regarding the degree of technological maturity.3) A typical core firm in 
either of the two industries operates a number of plants in parallel in which 
the final products supplied by the firm are manufactured. But a 
characteristic of the electric machinery industry is that each of such plants 
is specialized in some subset of final products, which, in view of the typical 
scale of production and the degree of technological maturity, substantially 
different from those which other plants in the same corporation are in charge 
of. The product lines handled within a plant typically have some 
interconnections with each other from the viewpoint of core technology. But 
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they are still diverse in the typical scale of production and the degree of 
technological maturity. To investigate how these features of the industry 
affect manufacturer-supplier relationships, I visited three different plants , 
of which characteristics are given in Table 1. Comparisons of the contractual 
framework follow. 
Table 1 about here 
     In common with the automobile industry, "basic contracts" are used and 
provide the basis for the contractual framework that governs recurrent type 
transactions in the electric machinery industry. However, two subtle 
differences arise reflecting the characteristics of this industry. First, it 
is each plant of the core firm which is the party to the contract on the buyer 
side. For some basic raw materials and a selected number of components which 
are used in common in several plants of the same corporation, the purchasing 
division of the corporate headquarters acts as the agent for all the plants 
concerned. In addition, this division sets the basic purchasing policies of 
the company and supervises the purchasing activities of all the plants. To 
see the details of purchasing activities, however, we have to look at the 
plant level. Second, a typical basic contract used in this industry does not 
presume that each object is transacted continuously for such a long period as 
two or four years. Thus it provides that each "order," instead of the 
"monthly schedule
," as in the automobile industry, is regarded as an 
individual contract when the supplier gives its consent to it. Also, the 
basic contract does not contain stipulations for the frequency of price 
adjustments. With these in mind, let us look next at actual practices. 
     I first show the typical length of the life of a given model. For 
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electronic rice cookers, the standard length is two years. A minor model 
change is made one year after the introduction of a new model. Many of other 
home appliances manufactured at Plant X have a similar cycle, though microwave 
ovens have a life of only one year. Electronic office equipment such as plain 
paper copiers have a shorter life than most home appliances. This is because 
nearly twenty manufacturers have been competing vigorously to establish market 
shares. The competition is especially keen at both ends of the price range. 
The cheapest model as well as the most expensive model endures less than a 
year. Models of intermediate price have a life of slightly more than a 
year. Control and measuring instruments for plant or home use have a 
relatively long life. In'some cases it reaches ten to twenty years . 
Instruments for office use such as plotters, however, have a much shorter life 
-- approximately one year . In this way the length of the life of a given 
model varies depending on the nature of the product and the market therefor . 
     The quantity adjustment mechanism for the parts of mass produced products 
such as rice cookers, copiers, meters and compressors is remarkably similar to 
that found in the automobile industry. Once the core firm has ordered a 
particular part for a given model from a supplier, the core firm rarely 
switches suppliers during the life of this model.4) The amount of the part 
ordered by the core firm from this supplier changes monthly only in proportion 
to the change in demand for the final product to which the part in question is 
assembled. 
     The price adjustment mechanism for this class of parts is , again, similar 
to that found in the automobile industry. It is a well established practice 
in the case of this class of parts for the core firm to provide an occasion 
for the renegotiation of prices at six-month intervals, though this is not 
explicitly stipulated in the basic contract.5) On the other hand, for small 
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lot items, which characterize Plant Z, this practice of renegotiation at 
regular intervals is not found. 
     At the time of model changes, in common with the automobile industry , the 
supplier of a particular item for the current model is not necessarily awarded 
the contract for the same kind of part for the next model. Since the typical 
life of a given model is much shorter than that found in the automobile 
industry, competition among suppliers who are able to offer the same kind of 
part is all the more keen. 
     Finally, let us have a glance at the composition of suppliers to each 
core firm. Recall first that in this industry the party to the contract on 
the buyer side is basically an individual plant that manufactures a set of 
final products. To designate such a plant that acts as a purchaser, I use the 
term "core plant" hereafter. Each core plant has its own set of suppliers. 
Some members thereof may be simultaneously supplying to other plants of the 
same corporation, but there are a nonnegligible number of firms that are 
supplying only to this plant. Correspondingly, it is hard to find in this 
industry a comprehensive association which organizes a great majority of 
suppliers to the corporation, like Kyohokai mentioned above. Further, a 
remarkable fact is that, even at the level of each core plant, such an 
association that includes the great majority of suppliers to the plant as 
members has not been organized. 
     Plant X, as of 1985, had 253 suppliers, if we count every firm from which 
the core plant purchased more than six million yen per six-month period. Of 
these, 117 are classifiable as "subcontractors (shitauke kigyo)". Only 60 of 
these subcontractors have been organized into a cooperative union. The core 
plant is seeking to reduce the number of its subcontractors to approximately 
half. Plant Y had 985 suppliers in 1984, if we count every firm from which 
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the core plant bought something including raw materials that year. It is 
quite normal in the case of this plant for 20 per cent of suppliers to change 
every year. Overlapping with this change, the core plant is trying to remove 
some of its subcontractors from the set of its suppliers . As of 1985, Plant Z 
had an association for its subcontractors and a separate association for more 
general suppliers. The former association does not include all the 
subcontractors with which this core plant had transactions in 1984 . 
     A glance taken above at the composition of suppliers reveals two points 
to be noted. First, though some portion of the first tier suppliers to each 
core plant in the electric machinery industry seem to have longstanding 
relationships with the core plant, this plainly does not apply to all of the 
suppliers on the first tier. This forms a marked difference in comparison to 
the case of the automobile industry. Second, overlapping with this 
heterogeneity of suppliers, which comes out with respect to the duration and 
cohesiveness of their relations to core plants, another sort of heterogeneity 
is more readily observable than in the automobile industry: distinction 
between subcontractors and general suppliers. In Section 3, I examine these 
two kinds of heterogeneity and their interrelations more in detail. 
3. Types of Suppliers and of Their Relations to Core Firms 
     In this section I discriminate among several types of suppliers and of 
their relations to core firms. I start from discussing the dichotomy of 
suppliers into subcontractors and general suppliers which was touched upon at 
the end of Section 2. This dichotomy is a traditional one which has been used 
not only in purchasing practices in the electric machinery industry, but also 
by many of social scientists and administrators in Japan. The dichotomy has 











become somewhat too coarse, however, especially in the automobile industry, 
due to increasing customization of parts. The upshot is that the classical 
dichotomy cannot give a proper place to those suppliers which develop parts to 
be manufactured in response to broad specifications transmitted from core 
firms. Based on this observation, I develop a scheme to classify parts and 
suppliers which is a natural extension of the classical dichotomy. The second 
task of this section is to examine the heterogeneity of suppliers in terms of 
the duration and cohesiveness of their relations to core firms and to relate 
it to the first kind of heterogeneity. 
3.1 Classical dichotomy of suppliers 
     Figure 1 shows the composition of parts and materials and that of their 
sources used by Plant Y during a recent fiscal year. The left hand column 
shows, first of all, the outcome of the "Make or Buy" decision. Second, it 
shows that the purchased items are divided into two categories: "purchased 
goods (konyuhin)" and "ordered goods (gaichuhin)". I start from the meaning 
of this classification. 
Figure 1 about here 
     The classification above is a classical dichotomy which has been widely 
used in the electric machinery industry. The conventional view of the 
subcontracting relationship in Japan as well as the definition of 
subcontracting used in official statistics and public administration closely 
corresponds to this dichotomy. An alternative expression used in official 
statistics in place of "purchased goods" is "marketed goods (shihanhin)," 
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which conveys the criterion for classification more clearly. That is , this 
category corresponds to those goods which are offered to the public 
irrespective of the will of the core firm and are therefore purchasable by 
merely selecting from the catalog. In contrast, "ordered goods" means those 
goods or processing services which are supplied by outside firms according to 
specifications issued by the core firm. 
     "Ordered goods" constitute a subset of the whole collection of goods and 
services that are supplied according to specifications provided by the core 
firm, which include parts and services supplied from in-house plants. 
Historically, this collection has been regarded as equivalent to the 
collection of goods and services for which the core firm itself has key 
technology and manufacturing know-how and which in-house plants could 
therefore supply if the core firm wished. For economic reasons , the core firm 
has assigned a relatively peripheral portion thereof to outside firms while 
retaining a central portion inside. 
     It has thus been taken for granted that the term "ordered goods" 
corresponds to the term "subcontractor". The right hand column of Figure 1 in 
fact shows that the sum of the portion supplied by "common subcontractors" and 
by "excellent subcontractors" largely corresponds to the total amount of 
"ordered goods" . There is no question in that "suppliers in general" in 
Figure 1 are supplying "purchased goods," so that "related companies" , 
companies in which the core firm holds substantial shares, must be providing 
both "purchased goods" and "ordered goods". 
     The reader may want to know at this point the meaning of the distinction 
between "common subcontractors" and "excellent subcontractors" as well as the 
role played by "related companies" in Figure 1. But I put aside these issues 
for later discussions and examine in the next subsection whether the dichotomy 
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of goods and that of suppliers we have just seen are similarly used in the 
automobile industry. 
3.2 Subcontractors in the automobile industry 
     In the automobile industry, the meaning of the term "subcontractor" has 
become much ambiguous. A basic underlying factor is the following 
development. Core firms in this industry have increasingly come to issue 
specifications even for those items for which they have not acquired 
manufacturing capabilities and which have been thought by outside researchers 
to be "marketed goods." Thus virtually all of the parts supplied from outside 
firms can now be regarded as "ordered goods." It is indeed very difficult to 
find, from among those items that are being supplied from suppliers on the 
first tier, such parts that fall under "marketed goods" category. Even so, 
one could still call all the firms that supply "ordered goods" to a given core 
firm "subcontractors" thereof. Then, however, the "subcontractor" category 
would include such firms as Hitachi, Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, 
etc., which are not only large in company size but also equipped with 
significant capabilities for the development of the parts concerned. One of 
the main reasons why the subcontracting relationship has attracted the 
attention of scholars and administrators in Japan lies in the concern that 
typical subcontractors, being small and underdeveloped, face the danger of 
being exploited by core firms and hence may deserve special protection from 
public authorities. In view of such a concern, the conventional definition of 
subcontractor thus seems to have become too broad, at least in the automobile 
industry. In fact, major Japanese automobile manufacturers have abolished the 
use of the word "subcontractor". This seems to reflect at least partly the 
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situation described above. 
     Nevertheless, a broad classification of suppliers is possible based on 
the function exercised by the supplier concerned. First, we note that there 
is an important dichotomy of purchased parts in the practice of automobile 
manufacturers between: (1) parts manufactured by outside suppliers according 
to the drawings supplied by the core firm; and (2) parts manufactured by 
outside suppliers according to the drawings made by the respective suppliers 
themselves and approved by the core firm. Since the drawings in (1) and (2) 
are called "drawings supplied (taiyozu)" and "drawings approved (shoninzu)" 
respectively, let us call the parts (1) and (2) "DS parts" and "DA parts" 
respectively. Second, carrying over this distinction into categories of 
suppliers, let us call those firms which predominantly supply DS parts "DS 
suppliers" and those which predominantly supply DA parts "DA suppliers." Note 
that DS suppliers are providing basically only capabilities for manufacturing 
of the parts transacted, while DA suppliers are providing capabilities for 
product development as well. 
     Although major Japanese automobile manufacturers have eliminated the word 
"subcontractor" from their company lang uage as mentioned above, there has 
also been a remarkable degree of consensus among them that, if the word has to 
be used by outside researchers at all, the most accurate use would be to let 
the word designate DS suppliers in the meaning defined above.6) I should add 
here that supply of "DS parts", in its simplist extreme, merges into supply of 
processing services such as subassembly or machining according to minute 
instructions given by the purchaser. Taking these into consideration, I 
propose to use the term "subcontractor" as synonymous to "DS supplier" in the 
broad sense, which includes suppliers of such processing services. 
     The following should now be clear: it is expansion of "DA parts" in 
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relation to "DS parts" and to "marketed goods" that has made the conventional 
meaning of subcontractor ambiguous, driving the classical dichotomy of 
suppliers out of use in the automobile industry. 
3.3 A classification scheme of parts and suppliers 
     Let us consider how observations made in 3.1 and 3.2 can be integrated to 
generate a common scheme applicable to both industries to classify parts and 
suppliers thereof. 
     I examine first whether the concepts of "DS parts" and "DA parts" 
introduced in 3.2 have relevance in the electric machinery industry as well. 
It can be relatively easily confirmed that the notion of subcontractors 
conceived by purchasing managers of core firms in the electric machinery 
industry is in fact not different from the definition I proposed above. This 
leads to the following reasoning. It must be relative thinness of DA parts, 
in relation to "marketed goods" type parts, that explains why the classical 
dichotomy of suppliers has been still used in this industry. Indeed, in 
contrast to the automobile industry, core plants in this industry buy lots of 
"marketed goods" type parts such as switches
, connectors, capacitors, 
resistors, cables, motors, memory ICs and so on, made according to 
standardized specifications. However, purchasing managers of these core 
plants are currently perceiving that the demarcation between "ordered goods" 
and "marketed goods," which was once clear-cut, tends to become blur as time 
goes by. Underlying this perception is the development that DA parts have 
come to be nonnegligible both with respect to the role they play for 
improvement of the final products and with respect to the proportion they 
occupy in the total amount of the purchased intermediate goods. One 
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conspicuous example of such DA parts is custom ICs. Thus we can confirm that 
concepts of DS parts and DA parts have relevance to both industries . 
      In contrast to the .automobile industry, where core firms rarely buy 
"marketed goods" t
ype parts, core plants in the electric machinery industry 
purchase both "marketed type" parts such as memory ICs and DA parts such as 
custom ICs often from identical firms. Thus, although the distinction between 
"marketed 
goods" and "DA parts" can always be clearly made, it is often not 
easy to tell whether a firm belongs to the "general supplier" category or 
falls under the "DA supplier" category. Nor does it seem necessary to regard 
each supplier as forming a monolithic entity in this respect. It seems more 
meaningful to see each of such firms as functioning as a "general supplier" to 
the core plant in question, to the degree in which it is supplying "marketed 
goods" type parts thereto, and at the same time, functioning as a "DA 
supplier" precisely in the specific region of transaction where this firm is 
supplying "DA parts" to the same core plant. I carry over the distinction 
between types of parts into types of suppliers just in this manner hereafter. 
     From the viewpoint of historical evolution, DA parts mainly originate 
from two directions: from "marketed goods" type parts and from DS parts . One 
route of evolution is as follows. As the demand for a final product 
manufactured by a given core firm grows into a large volume, the quantity of a 
particular part which this core firm can order from a given supplier to 
assemble into the final product in question also grows. Then it becomes 
easier for the core firm to ask the supplier to add some special modifications 
to specifications of the part, which have heretofore been common to all 
purchasing firms in the industry, in response to some specific needs that this 
core firm perceives. One reason is that the larger volume warrants specific 
investments that have to be incurred to implement such customization . In 
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addition, under such a large volume situation, it becomes easier for the core 
firm to persuade the supplier that such customization would have a further 
boosting effect on the demand. If the supplier agrees to produce such 
modified part, then a DA part emerges as a derivative from a "marketed goods" 
type part. Another route of evolution is as follows. At the early phase of 
development, core firms tend to buy relatively simple parts or elementary 
processing services from subcontractors. As time goes by, however, core firms 
select a number of firms that have relatively good qualities from among those 
suppliers that have already been tried and have these selected suppliers to 
supply parts in increasingly more assembled forms. In this process , core 
firms sometimes come to entrust substantial portion of the development stage 
of such assembled parts to the suppliers concerned, saving engineering man-
hours that would have to be incurred by themselves otherwise. When drawings 
of one of such parts come to be entirely done by the supplier concerned , with 
specifications still being issued from the core firm, then a DA part emerges 
originating from DS parts. 
     It should be noted here that there are cases in which some 
technologically advanced part, such as electronic fuel injection system or 
optic fiber wire harness, emerges from the outset as a DA part through R & D 
jointly done by some core firm, usually a leading firm of the industry, and 
some selected supplier thereof, and then the similar kind part diffuses 
industry wide afterwards. In such cases, the order of evolution is from 
"newly created DA part" to "more-marketed-goods-like DA part ." However, once 
standard elements of the part have been identified and established, the 
aforementioned argument as to the route to customization from "marketed goods" 
type part approximately applies to such items as well. It seems therefore a 
natural way in conceptualization to assign the DA parts category an 
                             18 -
intermediate region between "marketed goods" type parts and DS parts. 
     There exist some parts that can properly be characterized as quasi DA 
parts. For them, core firms provide only rough drawings, entrusting 
completion of details to the suppliers concerned. These parts therefore share 
some elements of DA parts, though they retain the basic character of DS 
parts. Similarly, we can distinguish subcategories among DA parts. Some DA 
parts are relatively closer to DS parts, others being closer to "marketed 
goods," looking from the degree in which the core firm in question gives 
detailed technological directions to the supplier concerned. 
     Based on these observations, I propose a scheme for classification of 
parts and suppliers shown by Table 2. The basic criterion for classification 
in this scheme is the degree of initiative that a typical supplier of a given 
category of part can exert vis-a-vis a given core firm in the development and 
the manufacturing stages. This variable, which henceforth will be called 
"degree of technological initiati
ve" for brevity, is measured along the 
horizontal axis of Table 2. The left hand extreme of this axis corresponds to 
a situation in which the supplier can exert only a very passive role both in 
the development and the manufacturing stages. The further rightward we go, 
both stages increasingly contain black-box elements looking from the core 
firm. On this axis I differentiate seven categories from I to VII. 
Subcontractors in my definition, or DS suppliers, span from I to III. I and 
II have been recognized in the previous literature, but III, the quasi DA 
parts suppliers, has not been distinguished therein. DA suppliers span from 
IV to VI. The classical dichotomy spotlighted I plus II and VII. In the 
actual development of the industries, however, regions from III to VI are 
growing. The scheme thus extends the classical dichotomy in a natural way by 
introducing subcategories that have been overlooked but are of increasing 
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importance. 
Table 2 about here 
     Examples of parts in Table 2 are taken from the automobile industry. The 
assignment of each of these parts to a column has been made for the purpose of 
illustration based on responses from managers of a number of core firms . Very 
interestingly, actual assignments sometimes differ among core firms
, 
reflecting the difference in the degree of technological expertise that they 
have accumulated with respect to particular items. For instance , core firms 
occupying the leading position in the industry tend to place such items as 
starter motors or batteries to relatively leftward positions among 
subcategories of DA parts in Table 2, say IV or V. On the other hand
, core 
firms occupying lower echelons tend to place the same items to more rightward 
positions, say somewhere very close to VII within VI. 
     This implies at the same time that, if, through concentrated investments
, 
a particular core firm achieves a higher technological expertise than 
heretofore concerning a given item and in relation to the state of technology 
that the suppliers of the item currently have, a leftward shift occurs in the 
positioning of the item by this core firm, vice versa. In this way, the 
scheme given by Table 2 can be used to express changes that occur over time as 
a net result of moves taken by the parties, as well as crossections taken at a 
given time point. 
3.4 Duration and cohesiveness of relations 
     Let us turn to another kind of heterogeneity of suppliers . that we noticed 
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to exist with respect to the duration and cohesiveness of their relations to 
core firms and investigate how this is related to the categories that have 
been differentiated above. 
     I examine first the the meaning of the distinction made in Figure 1 
between "common subcontractor" and "excellent subcontractors." Plant Y has 
been rating its subcontractors in terms of performances as well as potential 
capabilities, classifying them into A, B, C, and D based on the ratings. 
"Excellent subcontractors" comprises "Rank A" and "Rank B" subcontractors , 
"common subcontractors" being the rest . The core plant applies its effort to 
develop relationships selectively. "Excellent subcontractors" are supposed to 
be suitable candidates with which the core plant should seek to build up close 
and longstanding relationship, subject to repeated reappraisal though. "Rank 
A" firms are those which have been most successful in establishing reputation 
and the core plant often seeks to acquire part ownership therein. A "Rank B" 
firm can be reclassified into "Rank A" in due course of time, if it achieves 
substantial improvements in response to comments from the core plant, but may 
become "Rank C" if it persistently fails to respond in the right direction. 
"Rank D" firms are those which have finally come to be evaluated as lacking 
hopelessly possibility of improvements and the core plants wants to terminate 
the relation therewith at a suitable time point. A "Rank C" firm may also 
become either "Rank B" or "Rank D," depending on performances it will show 
henceforth. 
      One interesting point to note is how the core plant deals with "Rank C" 
firms as such. The core plant plans to increase the proportion of orders from 
"excellent subcontractors" at the expense of those from "common 
subcontractors" over time, removing simultaneously "Rank D" firms from the 
first tier. But the core plant does not expect that "Rank C" firms will 
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disappear from the first tier entirely. The management feel it difficult to 
recompose the first tier within a short time span so as to make it consisting 
entirely of "Class A" and "Class B" firms. Moreover, they feel it even 
necessary for the core plant to retain at least part of "Rank C" firms on the 
first tier as a capacity buffer, to which orders are placed rather 
intermittently only when capacities of the core plant and of more highly 
ranked subcontractors cannot absorb suddenly swollen up demands. 
     So far I described practices at Plant Y. But similar practices are found 
at Plant X and Plant Z as well. Interestingly, necessity of retaining firms 
to be used as a capacity buffer is more strongly expressed at Plant Y and 
Plant Z. On the other hand, purchasing managers of major core firms in the 
automobile industry unanimously assert that practices in the electric 
machinery industry of retaining capacity buffer type firms on the first tier 
sound rather strange to them. For them, once admitted to the first tier , 
suppliers should be more or less kept operating continuously, unless they have 
come to be rated so low that they be removed from the first tier entirely . 
     These observations suggest some generalizations to be made. The 
following notion on the subcontracting relationship in Japan has been 
prevalent, though gradually facing criticisms in recent years: the main reason 
for Japanese firms to subcontract is to utilize subcontractors as a capacity 
buffer. Although this notion is not quite compatible with another prevalent 
notion that Japanese firms tend to form family-like groups with perpetual 
trades between group members, the structural relation between the aspects 
which correspond to these two notions has not been illuminated. I submit , 
however, the following propositions. 
Proposition 1. Core firms continually exercise ratings on suppliers. With 
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  suppliers ranked as A and B based on cumulative ratings, core firms seek to 
  keep business as continuously as possible, and with those ranked as D
, core 
  firms seek to terminate the relation. Those ranked as C are dealt with as 
  marginal suppliers. 
Proposition 2. The more intermittent and uneven is the demand for the final 
  product which features a core firm or a core plant, the more necessary for 
  this firm or plant to retain marginal suppliers on the first tier as a 
  capacity buffer. 
     Now I consider how the system of ranking of suppliers by the core firm is 
related to the categories given in Table 2. In principle, the system of 
ratings of the kind described above is applied by the core firm regardless 
which category the supplier in question falls under. However, the brief 
description given in 3.3 concerning the routes of historical evolution via 
which DA parts emerge points to the following causal relations. First , the 
higher the ratings a given subcontractor receives, the higher the probability 
that this subcontractor receives an order for a part which requires more 
technological capabilities than previous rounds. Second, the higher the 
ratings a given supplier of a "marketed goods" type part receives, the higher 
the probability that this supplier receives an order for a DA part which is a 
derivative of the type it delivered in previous rounds. Based on these causal 
relations, it can be inferred that in comparison to regions I, II, and VII , 
firms with high ranks are more densely distributed within each of regions from 
III to VI. Combining this inference with Proposition 1, I submit: 
Proposition 3. In comparison to regions I, II, and VII in Table 2 , suppliers 
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  which have longstanding relations with a given core firm are more densely 
  distributed in regions from III to VI. 
4. Interactions between a Core Firm and a Supplier 
     I have shown that suppliers which maintain longstanding relations with a 
given core firm are to be found more densely in regions from III to VI in 
Table 2 where customized parts are transacted. Further, I have shown that in 
order to enter and maintain such longstanding relations the suppliers 
concerned should acquire at some time point and maintain continually 
afterwards high ratings from the core firm. This pair of findings in turn 
evoke the following question. What kind of specific capabilities are required 
of to be qualified as a superior supplier of customized parts? To answer this 
question, I examine in this section typical interactions between a given core 
firm and a supplier thereto that occur over time within and beyond the life of 
a given model of a final product. I deal with (1) suppliers of "marketed 
goods" type parts, (2) suppliers of DS parts, and (3) suppliers of DA parts, 
separately in this order. For each of these categories, I examine the 
following two kinds of interactions interrelatedly. The one is interactions 
that occur in the real domain concerning development, manufacturing, and 
delivery of the part. The other is interactions that occur in the price 
domain: price negotiations. Examination of these interactions illuminates what 
constitute the relation-specific skill of a supplier and how it is related to 
technological capabilities. 
4.1 Suppliers of "marketed goods" type parts 
     To be qualified as superior suppliers for the items that are to be 
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delivered continuously for a certain time span, even suppliers in this 
category are required to demonstrate following two properties that are not 
explicitly dealt with in the usual textbook of microeconomics: high 
reliability in quality assurance and high reliability in keeping up the 
delivery schedule, which may require continual fine tunings of shipments . In 
this sense, even suppliers in this category have to develop some skill to 
maintain the relation. In comparison to other two categories of suppliers
, 
however, interactions that involve development and manufacturing processes of 
the suppliers are less and, accordingly, the core firm knows relatively little 
about the processes. 
      It should be noted here that Japanese core firms tend to expect that each 
supplier can achieve price reduction by some targeted percentage within a 
certain time span reflecting efforts to reduce costs. For suppliers of this 
category, however, the process through which each .'supplier achieve cost 
reductions remains largely a black-box for the core firm . The core firm can 
only look at the price itself to measure the cooperativeness of the supplier 
in the dimension of price. And the only weapon that the core firm can 
mobilize to secure reasonable prices is to seek recourse to competition among 
potential suppliers of the same item. The number of potential suppliers 
ranges from zero in the-case of monopoly to a very large number in the case of 
competitive markets. 
4.2 Suppliers of DS parts 
     Reliabilities in quality and delivery are of course important for 
suppliers of DS parts as well, to acquire high ratings from the core firm . In 
addition, suppliers in this category have to develop and demonstrate the 
                                        - 25 -
following two kinds of capabilities. 
     The first is the ability to achieve during the manufacturing stage 
reductions of the manufacturing costs of the item transacted through 
"rationalization (gorika)
," or cost reduction through process improvements, 
and VA (value analysis), or efforts to reduce costs through proposals on 
improvements of the design of the part. As I remarked in 4.1 , typical 
Japanese core firms urge their suppliers to achieve stepwise price reductions 
within the life of a given model of a final product. In making this request, 
they normally expect that the suppliers would comply through the two kinds of 
conscious efforts to reduce costs just mentioned, "rationalization" and VA, 
rather than via sacrificing their profit margins. This is because the core 
firms know that the latter route would not endure. 
     The second is the ability, required in the development stage, to respond 
to the trial order or the invitation for quotation issued from the core firm 
with the price and quality that can clear the targets set by the core firm. 
This ability in turn is supposed to be based on abilities to skillfully design 
the manufacturing process in response to the drawings supplied from the core 
firm and to conduct VE (value engineering), or efforts to reduce prospective 
manufacturing costs through proposals on improvements of the design of the 
part during the period prior to mass production. 
     As has been reported by Asanuma (1984b), "rationalization," VA, and VE 
are all rewarded directly in some form of surplus profit built in the formula 
for negotiated prices. But a more indirect and long-run economic incentive 
for the supplier accompanies each of these efforts. The demonstrated results 
of such efforts are considered by the core firm as indicators of technological 
capabilities of the supplier. And as cumulative ratings given by the core 
firm along these dimensions rise up, the probability that this supplier will 
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be awarded a slightly more favorable and/or more challenging task at the next 
round becomes higher. 
4.3 Suppliers of DA parts 
     In addition to all of the properties and abilities listed in the 
foregoing two subsections, the following ability is required of suppliers of 
DA parts to be rated highly from the core firm. That is the ability to 
develop successfully within a limited time span a part in response to 
specifications issued from the core firm. This obviously includes abilities 
and equipment to design, manufacture and test trial parts, as well as 
abilities to understand and finely adapt to the subtle needs of the core 
firm. The ability to make proposals on improvements of the specifications of 
the part concerned in a sufficiently early phase of the development as a feed-
back to the core firm is also included. 
     To the degree that development processes are entrusted to the supplier, 
knowledge on the detailed cost contents becomes more difficult to be obtained 
by the core firm. In this sense, suppliers become more independent and 
acquire higher technological capabilities than suppliers of DS parts. 
Nevertheless, they are required of more complex skills to respond efficiently 
to the needs of the core firm. Since developments of parts in response to 
specifications issued from the core firm have to be initiated at least several 
months earlier than the time point when the core firm supplies drawings to 
suppliers of DS parts, interactions between the parties occur over a longer 
time and become more complex for DA parts. Many of the quasi DA parts have 
similar properties. 
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4.4 The relation-specific skill 
     Let us conclude this section with constructing the concept of the 
relation-specific skill. Basically this is the skill required on the part of 
the supplier to respond efficiently to the specific needs of the core firm. 
Formation of this skill requires that learning through repeated interactions 
with a particular core firm be added to the basic technological capability 
which the supplier has accumulated. In this sense, the skill always consists 
of two layers: the surface layer which corresponds to accumulated learning 
acquired through transactions with a given core firm, on the one hand, and the 
basic layer which corresponds to general technological capabilities, on the 
other.7) Further, we can introduce multidimensionality to this two-layer 
structure in the following way. 
     In subsections from 4.1 to 4.3 above, I enumerated various kinds of 
abilities which a supplier is required to develop and exert in order to 
respond to the specific needs of the core firm. Each ability becomes more or 
less visible to and is rated by the core firm at a certain phase of 
interactions that occur between the core firm and the supplier with respect to 
a given part. Let us array these abilities according to the sequence in which 
interactions corresponding to each ability occur over time and classify the 
abilities into the following four disjoint groups. 
     X1: abilities that are required of the supplier to exert and become 
          visible to the core firm during the early phase of the development 
           stage. 
     X2: abilities that are required of the supplier to exert and become 
           visible to the core firm during the late phase of the development 
           stage. 
     X3: abilities that are required of the supplier to exert during the 
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           commercial production stage concerning the routine operation of the 
          manufacturing process and become visible to the core firm at 
          deliveries. 
     X4: abilities that are required of the supplier to exert during the 
           commercial production stage concerning improvements of the 
           manufacturing process and become more or less visible to the core 
          firm at the time of price negotiations. 
     More specifically, X1 consists of (1) ability to develop the part in 
response to the specifications received from the core firm; and (2) ability to 
propose improvements on the specifications received from the core firm. X2 
consists of (1) ability to develop the manufacturing process according to the 
drawings which has been either supplied by the core firm or made by the 
supplier and approved by the core firm; and (2) ability to reduce prospective 
costs through VE. X3 comprises (1) ability to assure quality and (2) ability 
to assure timely delivery. X4 comprises (1) ability to reduce costs through 
"rationalization" and (2) ability to reduce costs through VA. 
     Thus, according to the descriptions given in subsections from 4.1 to 4.3, 
each of X1, X2, X3, and X4 has at least two components. But, for simplicity, 
let us deal with Xi (i = 1, ..., 4) hereafter as if each of them comprised 
just one component and denote the level of this component by 
x. 1 (i = 1, ..., 4). 
     I define the relation-specific skill that a supplier has accumulated and 
can exert in its transactions with a given core firm by (X1, X2, X3, X4) and 
denote the level of the skill that the supplier has achieved at a certain time 
point by (xl, x2, x3, x4). 
     Thus, the concept of relation-specific skill that I constructed above is 
essentially multidimensional. Further, in the following sense, the 
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dimensionality of the skill differs depending on which major category the part 
and the supplier in question falls under. Suppose that the part in question 
is a DS part. Then, by definition of DS parts, X1 is irrelevant for this 
transaction. On the other hand, X2, X3, and X4 all matter . In other words, 
we can express the relation-specific skill of a particular supplier of this 
part by (0, x2, x3, x4) with x2, x3, and x4 assuming some positive values. 
Next, suppose that the part in question is a "marketed goods" type part . 
Then, X3 is the only component of the relation-specific skill that directly 
matters and is visible to the core firm. In fact, both to assure quality and 
to assure timely delivery, abilities to skillfully develop and to skillfully 
operate the manufacturing process matter. But, from the viewpoint of the core 
firm, these abilities can only become assessible through the supplier's 
performances shown at each delivery. In this sense, the relation-specific 
skill of this supplier can be expressed by (0, 0, x3, 0) with x3 assuming some 
positive value. Finally, suppose that the part in question is a DA part. 
Then, all of X1, X2, X3, and X4 matter. Accordingly, we can express the 
relation-specific skill of the supplier in question by (xl , x2, x3, x4) with 
all components assuming some positive values. Note that visibility of X
2 and 
X4 to the core firm in this case varies according to which subcategory this 
part and supplier falls under. Thus, if the part belongs to IV in Table 2, X2 
and X4 will be more visible; if it belongs to VI in the same diagram, they 
will be less visible and the skill of the supplier could approximately be 
expressed by (xl, 0, x3, 0). I summarize the foregoing arguments by Table 3. 
     This way of constructing the concept of relation-specific skill enables 
the distinction between the following two notions: the level of a particular 
component of the skill, on the one hand, and the degree of complexity of the 
skill, on the other. If a pair of suppliers fall under different major 
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categories, then the degree of complexity of the skill differs between the two 
firms and their skills therefore are not comparable in the sense of ordering 
of vectors. In other words, the two firms cannot be given a rank-ordering in 
terms of relation-specific skill. If the two firms belong to the same major 
category but deal with different kinds of parts, their skills become roughly 
comparable. If the two firms deal with the same kind of part , say brake or 
battery, their skills become strictly comparable and the two firms can be 
given a clear-cut rank-ordering. 
     We can rotate Table 3 clockwise by right angle and make the vertical axis 
of Table 3 overlap with the horizontal axis of Table 2. The brackets in Table 
3 characterized with "low visibility to the core firm" shows precisely in 
which spheres the supplier in question can exert a high degree of 
technological initiative vis-a-vis the core firm, keeping black-box elements 
in the processes looking from the core-firm. As to the effect of the degree 
of technological initiative on price negotiations, I submit the following 
proposition based on the arguments presented up to this point. 
Proposition 4: The higher the degree of technological initiative that a 
  supplier has concerning a part, the more probable that this supplier can 
  earn from the transaction of this part some surplus profit which is not 
  readily perceptible by the core firm. The core firm can counteract to this 
  tendency by investing in the technology concerned, including initiation of 
  part in-house production, or by finding alternative suppliers. 
     But what about the effects of the level, on the one hand, and the degree 
of complexity, on the other, of the relation-specific skill on interfirm 
negotiations? And how are these effects related to Proposition 4? I will 
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discuss these problems in Section 5. 
5. Relation to the Theoretical Literature 
      Summarizing observations on interactions between a core firm and its 
suppliers, I have formulated the concept of the relation-specific skill in 
Section 4. From this point we can proceed a step further to base the notion 
of the relational quasi-rent, which has been introduced by Aoki (1988) , on our 
formulation of the relation-specific skill. This will be done below in 5 .1. 
Then in 5.2 I discuss briefly how the results reported in this paper can be 
related to Williamson's'framework to classify transactions. 
5.1 Distribution of the relational quasi-rent 
     Take a core firm and all of the suppliers with which this core firm has 
transactions currently and name these suppliers "incumbents." Suppose for 
simplicity that this core firm is manufacturing only one kind of final 
product. At least a portion of the incumbents consists of those suppliers 
with which the core firm has maintained longstanding relations , as we have 
seen. Due to the relation-specific skill that these suppliers have 
accumulated, the entire system formed by the core firm and the incumbents must 
be generating some surplus value added in comparison to the fictitious state 
in which all of the incumbents have been replaced by non-incumbents. This 
surplus value-added corresponds to the relational quasi-rent introduced by 
Aoki (1988). Based on the scheme to classify parts and suppliers that I 
introduced in this paper, I elaborate his argument on distribution of the 
relational quasi-rent. 
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     Denote the amount of the relational quasi-rent that is generated by the 
system within a certain time span (say, a year) by R. Denote the portion of R 
that is attributable to the 1-th kind of part by Rl. As we have seen , 
typically there are two to three incumbents who are supplying the 1-th kind of 
part, if this belong to.customized parts in the automobile industry. The core 
firm and each of the suppliers of the 1-th kind of part share RI according to 
some suitable ratios. As we have seen, the supplier which has achieved higher 
level of the relation-specific skill is ranked higher in comparison to other 
suppliers of the same kind of part, and tends to be offered more favorable 
business by the core firm. For instance, the supplier may be able to receive 
orders for a larger number of different car makes in parallel than any of its 
competitors receives, or to receive an order for a car make which sells in a 
larger volume than any other car makes which some of its competitors is in 
charge of. Thus the incumbents are apportioned shares in Rl respectively 
according to the ranks they are awarded from the core firm. 
     In the extreme case where the incumbent suppliers of the 1-th kind of 
part comprise only one firm, the situation of bilateral monopoly emerges. 
This is the case analogous to the situation, in the context of analytical 
framework introduced by Shaked and Sutton (1987), where the parameter T , which 
can be interpreted as indicating the degree of difficulty of switching the 
partner looking from the employer, approaches infinite. In the other extreme 
where none of the incumbent suppliers of the 1-th kind of part can exceed non-
incumbents in terms of relation-specific skill, the situation is analogous in 
the same framework to the case where T approaches one and the Walrasian type 
distributional outcome emerges as the limit. In the intermediate cases where 
the "two vendor policy" has been effectively implemented by the core firm , the 
situation is analogous to the cases where T takes intermediate values. In 
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practice, it is remarkably common to all core firms that they do not want to 
maintain bilateral monopoly situation. Whenever feasible, they endeavor to 
correct the situation by developing alternative qualified sources. This can 
be interpreted, in a framework similar to that introduced by Shaked and 
Sutton, as an effort to reduce T, a surrogate for the bargaining power of the 
supplier concerned. 
     As the next step, I consider another kind of part, say the m-th kind of 
part. If Rm > R1, I call the m-th kind of part " a part which has more weight 
than the 1-th part in the composition of the final product which the core firm 
supplies." For instance, engine has more weight than electronic fuel 
injection system in the composition of a car, the latter having more weight 
than transmission. If a supplier which used to supply only the 1-th kind of 
part until recently successfully receives an order for the m-th kind of part 
in addition to the older line of business, it acquires a positive share in Rm 
in addition to that in R1. Then it achieves a larger share in the whole R 
than it used to have. 
     Thus for a supplier that seeks to grow, the following three means are 
available. 
(1) Within the 1-th kind of part, to endeavor to achieve a higher rank by 
   accumulating higher relation-specific skill. 
(2) To endeavor to enter the business for another kind of part, desirably 
   with more weight in the composition of the final product than the old line, 
   dealing with the same core firm. 
(3) To endeavor to enter or increase the business with other core firms. 
Combinations of these means give strategies, or paths of evolution, that 
suppliers have actually chosen or can choose for their growth. 
     In the arguments given in this section up to this point, I have not dealt 
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with the distinction between major categories of parts yet but have discussed 
only the distinction between different kinds of parts. Let us introduce at 
this point the former distinction into our discussion. When a supplier of a 
DS part seeks to grow through diversifying into another kind of part, a 
natural order for this supplier is to launch on production of another DS part, 
which has some interconnection in view of core technology with the DS part it 
has been supplying heretofore. In this case, the 1-th kind of part, the older 
line of business, and the m-th kind of part, the new line of business, belong 
to the same major category. But, at some point in the course of its 
evolution, the supplier may successfully enter production of a DA part, based 
on technological capabilities and reputation it has achieved. At this point, 
development across major categories, rather than that within a major category, 
occurs. What are the incentives for suppliers to seek developments across 
major categories? We can distinguish the following two effects of the 
development across major categories on the profitability of the supplier 
concerned: (1) the profit margin effect; and (2) the value added effet. 
     The profit margin effect is basically given by Proposition 4. Adding 
slight modifications to Proposition 4, I submit: 
Proposition 5: Let 1 and m be two different kinds of parts. Suppose that 1 
  belongs to either the DS parts category or the DA parts category. Suppose 
  further that m belongs to a different major category that lies in the right 
  hand side in Table 2 to the major category which I falls under. Assume that 
  the weights of I and m in the composition of the final product are about the 
   same. Assume further that the numbers of incumbents for 1 and m are about 
  the same. Then, the profit margin which a supplier can earn from a unit of 
  the part m will be larger than that which this supplier can earn from a unit 
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  of part 1. 
     When a supplier which has supplied a "marketed goods" type part to a core 
firm agrees to begin supplying a DA part derived from the "marketed goods" 
type part to this core firm, however, it is normally expected that the weight 
of the part in the composition of the final product will increase by the 
transition contemplated. The share of the supplier in the relational quasi-
rent brought forth by the new part may become somewhat smaller in comparison 
to the older part, since the core firm may claim a larger share based on its 
own contribution. But even if this reduction of the supplier's share occured
, 
it would be compensated by the increase of size of the relational quasi-rent . 
     As a summary, I submit: 
Proposition 6: Suppose that 1 is a "marketed goods" type part and that m is a 
  DA part derived from 1. Then, Rm> Rl. 
     Competition among incumbents to a core firm in their endeavor to grow 
following the strategies seen above may push up the whole R as an aggregated 
result, if, during the same time period, none of the non-incumbents can reach 
the level and complexity of the skill that would be enough to replace at least 
one of the incumbents, through technological investments and transactions with 
other superior core firms. 
     In this way, my scheme to classify parts and suppliers can be used to 
analyze paths for upgrading of and incentives for a supplier in a step more 
articulated way than the previous literature. 
5.2 The scheme to classify transactions 
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     Williamson (1979) classifies transactions along the following three 
dimensions: (1) the degree of uncertainty which parties to the transaction 
face; (2) the degree of frequency of the transaction; and (3) the degree to 
which transaction-specific investments are incurred (the degree of asset 
specificity, in short). Below I briefly compare my scheme with Williamson's 
framework in this order. First, I did not discuss the issue of uncertainty 
fully in this paper. However, I introduced the notion of degree of 
technological maturity of the final product, which is an important determinant 
of the degree of uncertainty. Regarding this factor, I observed the following 
fact at Plant Y: while 20 percent of suppliers to this plant are said to 
change annually as remarked in 2.2, suppliers for meters and compressors have 
been fixed. This suggests the following proposition. 
Proposition 7: The more immature the key technology for a final product , the 
  more incentive there will be for the core firm to keep the membership of the 
  set of suppliers open for this particular product. 
Williamson (1979) gives the following prediction concerning the effect of an 
increase in the degree of uncertainty on bilateral governance: the parties 
either have to make the good transacted less customized or to make the 
contract more elaborate. To this, I add my Proposition 7. 
     Proposition 7 can be explained in my scheme by the following reasoning. 
Take an incumbent supplier for such final product. As I argued in 4.4, the 
relation-specific skill consists of two layers. In the case of the product 
featured by technological immaturity, the competitive edge which this 
incumbent keeps at the present moment with respect to the surface layer, the 
skill acquired through transaction, can easily be cancelled out at the next 
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moment by the advantage which a non-incumbent might achieve in the basic layer 
through purely technological investments. 
     Second, the typical scale of production of the final product caused by 
the time pattern or intermittency of incoming demand, which I used as another 
variable in this paper, brings a finer partition within Williamson's 
"recurrent" class of transactions along the dimension of frequency . 
     Third, several differences are found between Williamson's treatment of 
asset specificity and my way of dealing with relation-specific skill. The 
first difference is that while he treats asset specificity as if it could be 
measured by a scalar, I deal with the relation-specific skill as something to 
be expressed by a multi-dimensional vector. Further, in my scheme, the 
dimensionality of this vector differs depending on which category the supplier 
in question falls under. For instance, for a supplier of a DA part, the 
relation-specific skill that this supplier has accumulated with respect to 
some core firm i is expressed by a four dimensional vector (x1i, x2i, x3i, 
x4i) with x11 assuming a positive value. The second difference is that while 
Willamson emphasizes such investments in specific equipment or locations that 
would come to be locked into a relation with a particular core firm once 
invested, I mainly focus on human know-how accumulated in a supplier as an 
organization. Thus, if a core firm numbered i is superior to another core 
firm j, achieving a high value of xki through transactions with core firm i 
may have a spillover effect on xkj in the same kind of skill that this 
supplier can exert in transactions with another core firm j. In this sense, 
investments made by a supplier in relation-specific skill do not necessarily 
come to be locked into a relation with a particular core firm. In other 
words, accompanying either xki or xkj, some general capabilities grow. 
      Finally, there is another difference concerning the time horizon of the 
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relation analyzed. Williamson assumes that initial negotiation on the initial 
price and specifications of the item has already been concluded before the 
analysis begins. The analysis is focused on "interim adjustments," which 
become necessary as time goes on, the time length of the transaction being 
supposed to be the same as that of the relation. On the other hand, 
longstanding relations I dealt with in this paper can span much longer time . 
It can be maintained over different generations of the same make of the final 
product. Each time when a new model is developed, the relationship is 
renewable with reappraisal of the supplier's capabilities and renogotiation of 
the terms of trade. This difference in the time horizon of analysis seems to 
partly reflect the difference between contractual practices in the United 
States and those in Japan. But, due to the limitation of space, I have to cut 
out descriptions of this difference. This point as well as a full analysis of 
implications brought by the differences between Williamson's argument and mine 
are left for discussions on another occasion. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
     In this paper I showed that a variety of relations exist between a 
typical Japanese core firm and suppliers thereto. I showed further that 
longstanding relations are to be explained in economic rather than cultural 
terms based on the relation-specific skill accumulated by suppliers as well as 
ratings exercised thereon by the core firm. I constructed the concept of 
relation-specific skill as something multidimensional which has different 
dimensionality depending on types of parts transacted. In passing, I analyzed 
effects of the characteristics of the final product on the mode of relations 
between the core firm and suppliers concerned. Finally, I related the results 
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acquired to works by Aoki and Williamson. 
     Several points remain to be given further illuminations. For one thing
, 
I have not analyzed fully in this paper the determinants of make-or-buy 
decisions. Relatedly, I have not clarified the role of related companies . 
For another, I have not given any international comparisons in this paper . 
These points are to be discussed on other occasions .
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                                     Footnotes 
   The first version of this paper was presented at the Rokko Conference in 
July 1985 and at a seminar organized by Oliver E. Williamson at Yale in June 
1986. The second version Asanuma (1986) was presented at a seminar at 
Stanford in September 1986 and at a U.S.-Japan Symposium organized by MITI in 
Tokyo in January 1987. I thank the participants of these meetings , Ronald 
Dore, Kazuo Koike, Masahiko Aoki, Daniel Okimoto, Scott Masten, C. Mustafa 
Mohatarem, Keinosuke Ono, Charles Horioka, Haruo Imai, Ken Ariga , and a 
referee of this Journal for helpful comments and suggestions. Research 
leading to this article was supported by grants from the Japanese Ministry of 
Education, the Japan Economic Research Foundation, and the Kyoto University 
70th Anniversary Memorial Foundation. 
1) When the demand for a subkind of part is large enough , there are cases in 
which more than one supplier receive orders for this same kind of part. 
However, in such cases as well, some measure is normally taken by the core 
firm so as to stabilize the relative status of each supplier during the life 
of the model. For instance, each supplier is assigned a fixed proportion of 
the total demand. 
2) See Shiomi (1985), 97-98. 
3) The degree of technological maturity is the inverse of the degree of 
technological immaturity. By the latter term I mean the degree to which the 
key functions as well as the key components of the final product in question 
are in a relatively fluid state from technological viewpoint. For instance, 
since the first wordprocessor that can deal with the Japanese language 
appeared early in 1970s, increasingly more handy models with more elaborate 
functions came out, within a remarkably short period. This was largely due to 
rapid advancement of LSI technology and was accompanied by drastic reductions 
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of costs and prices, which in turn boosted rapid expansion of the market. 
This means that during the last fifteen years this product remained 
technologically immature in the meaning defined above. 
4) Precisely speaking, a purchasing manager of Plant Y admitted the 
possibility that he may suggest supplier switching as a kind of threat even 
within the life of a given model; he may even carry out the threat , however 
rare this may be. On the other hand, managers of Plants X and Z asserted that 
it is a well-established custom to refrain from such interim supplier 
switching. Thus it cannot be asserted that supplier switching within the life 
of a given model is never planned or executed. My assessment is that the 
dominant trend is to refrain from it, however. 
5) For some items characterized by technological immaturity and vigorous 
competition, there are cases in which the price is changed at shorter 
intervals. 
6) For instance, refer to the list of replies to a questionnaire survey on the 
criteria used by automobile manufacturers to classify transactions into 
subcontracting, purchasing, and car assembly subcontracting attached as Table 
IV-A-3 to Kikai Shinko Kyokai Keizai Kenkyusho (1975). 
7) There are dynamic interactions between these two layers. For instance , to 
respond to a specific need expressed by a core firm, the supplier in question 
may have to be equipped with, or have to develop anew, a method to process a 
new kind of material, or a method to design a more compact tip than the ones 
that have been available heretofore. Such .methods are or will become 
applicable to other uses as well, forming part of general technological bases 
of the supplier. 
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